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The Lapindo mudflow disaster has resulted in physical and non-physical 
tremendous, causing a crisis for the social life of citizens in Porong, and 
surrounding areas. To address the impact of the Lapindo mudflow disaster 
needed help advocacy NGOs and govertment intervention in various forms of 
social rehabilitation programs.This study aims to identify and describe how the 
Lapindo mudflow disaster impact and the role of advocacy NGOs and the 
government intervention in the process of social rehabilitation for victims of the 
Lapindo mudflow disasater. The results dhowed that the Lapindo mudflow 
disaster has resulted in the destruction of the physical form of settlement areas, 
rice fields, agrcultural, and industrial area of 1,071 hectares, about 16 villages 
and 33 factories were distroyed, approximately 48,983 people were displaced, 
abd 33 schools were destroyed, as well as non-physical impacts such as social, 
health, education, psychological, economic, and so on. Social advocacy by 
NGOs include mentoring programs and ligitation efforts. While governmnt 
intervention in the process of social rehabilitation for victims of the Lapindo 
mudflow disaster stated in the policy as stipulated by Presidential Decree, 
namely Presidential Decree No. 14/2007, Presidential Decree No. 48/2008, 
Presidential Decree No. 40/2009, Presidential Decree No. 37/2012, Presidential 
Decree No. 33/2013. Forms of gevernment intervention include facilitation of 
policy, institutional, and budgetary allocations. 
 






Dated May 29, 2006 to the beginning of the emergence of the Lapindo mudflow disaster. 
Mud with a volume between 100 thousand to 150 thousand M3 per day, out of the 
bowels of the earth and the area drowned residential areas, agriculture, and industry 
(Batubara & Utomo, 2012:3)2. The central location of the Lapindo mudflow in District of 
Porong, Sidoarjo regency, approximately 12 km south of the  town of Sidoarjo. Mudflow 
central location about 15 meters froms the Banjar Panji-1 (BJP-1), which is a gas 
exploration well owned by PT Lapindo Brantas Inc. (PT LBI), as the Brantas block 
operator. Brantas block area stretches from regency of Jombang, Mojokerto, Sidoarjo to 
Pasuruan, East Java Province. Lapindo mudflow location is a residential area and the 
main industrial area in East Java. Not far from the location of the mudflow there is a toll 
road-Gempol Surabaya, Surabaya-Malang highway and Banyuwangi-Surabaya-
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Pasuruan highway, and the cross-track Railways East Surabaya-Malang and Surabaya-
Bayuwangi pathway. 
 
According Prasetia and Batubara (2010:40)3, Lapindo mudflow disaster is a disaster that 
is very complex when viewed from the genealogy of the disaster. Theoretical debates 
involving experts from all over the world. Generally, expert opinion was split into two 
camps, who argue that the disaster was caused by drilling activity in gas exploration 
wells Banjar Panji-1 (BJP-1) belong to PT LBI, and among those who argue that the 
mudflow disaster caused by reactivation of regional faults Watukosek due Yogyakarta 
earthquake on May 27, 2006, two days before the Lapindo mudflow disaster occurs.  
 
A meeting of petroleum geologists in South Africa, has concluded a mud volcano in 
Indonesia was caused by the drilling of a gas exploration well, not an earthquake that 
occurred a few days before. After debating new evidence, 42 out of the 74 American 
Association of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG) scientists in the audience were convinced 
the drilling was the trigger of the eruption and only three voted for the earthquake. A 
further 16 believed the evidence was inconclusive, and the remaining 13 felt that a 
combination of the earthquake and drilling was to blame. The finding of the AAPG 
conference adds weight to the opinion of several geologists who have found the mudflow 
from the volcano, dubbed ‘Lusi’ by locals, is the direct result of the drilling4.  
 
The Government established that the phenomenon of the Lapindo mudflow in Sidoarjo 
as natural disasters. Based on the decision of the Central Jakarta District Court dated  
November 27, 2007, stating that the government and Lapindo not guilty of an unlawfull 
act. Jakarta High Court verdict on June 13, 2008, strengthen the Central Jakarta District 
Court judgement of November 27, 2007, that the Sidoarjo mudflow incident because the 
natural tendency is more dominant symptom, not a human error. Decision of the 
Supreme Court of (MA) cassation, Apeil 3, 2009, stated that the mudflow was a natural 
phneomenon and not the fault of the industry and this decision has permanent legal 
force (inkracht). 
 
Untill 2013, Lapindo mudflow disasater has been running about seven years. However 
mudflow has not shown signs of stopping, although the volume is somewhat diminished. 
Not yet certain when the mudflow will stop. According to Richard Davies5 and his 
colleagues, it is difficult to predict when the certainty of Lapindo mudflow will stop. 
However, the possibility of mudflows will be extinguieshed predicted about 26 years. 
Thus, the Lapindo mudflow disaster expected to stop in the year 2037 that will come.6 
 
This study aims to describe and know how the Lapindo mudflow disater impact and how 
form and the role of governmnt intervention in the process of social rehabilitation of the 
victim of the Lapindo mudflow disaster. 
 
 
RIVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Disaster is seen as a condition or a situation, whether caused by human actions or 
natural, that is sudden and occurs gradually, leading to chaos and widespread loss of 
life, material, as well as the environment such that it exceeds the capacity of affected 
communities to dead with the use of the ability of its own resources. In line with the 







understanding of disaster, it is seen as a social disaster situation caused by human 
actions, which are sudden and occur gradually, leading to chaos and widespread loss of 
life, material, as well as the environment such that it exceeds the capacity of affected 
communities to handle using its own resource capabilities. Social disaster like this can 
be caused by social conflict openly and widely, war, or other social unrest7. 
 
Rehabilitation is the repair and restoration of all aspects of the public service or a 
community to an acceptable level in post-disaster areas with the main goal for the 
normalization or goes fairly all aspects of government and society in post-disaster areas. 
Rehabilitation is done through the following activities: (a) improvement of environmental 
disaster areas; (b) improvement of public infrastructure and facilities; (c) relief society 
home improvement; (d) psychosocial recovery; (e) health services; (f) reconciliation ad 
conflict resolution; (g) socio-economic of culture; (h) restoration of peace and order; (i) 
recovery of the functions of government; and (j) the recovery function public service8. 
 
Therefore, the social impact of the disaster exceeds the capabilities of the victims to deal 
with their own resource capability, then the necessary social rehabilitation to advocacy 
(assistance) and social intervention (interference) of social outsiders. According to Abdul 
Hakim Nusantara (Miller & Covey, 2005: vii)9, advocacy is defined as the act or process 
to defend or support. Support to community groups was intensified by weak individual, 
groups, non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), and community organizations that 
have a concern for the problems of human rights, the environment, proverty, and other 
forms of injustice. In a wider sense, advocacy is a political process by individuals or 
groups that are generally aimed at influencing public policy and resource allocation 
decisions within political, economic, or social institutions and systems. Advocacy can 
include many activities (form), such as: Budget advocacy, Bureaucratic advocacy, Health 
advocacy, Ideological advocacy, Interest-group advocacy, Legislative advocacy, Mass 
advocacy, and Media advocacy10. 
 
Samuel (2007: 616)11 states that public advocacy is a deliberate set of actions designed 
to influence public policy or public attitudes in order to beguile those who are 
marginalized. The main difference between public advocacy and human-centered 
advocacy is that the goal of human-centered advocacy to empower people, especially 
people who are marginalized. In the context of liberal democratic culture, is used as an 
instrument of public advocacy decoration by applying the meaning of non-violence and 
constituional. Public advocacy as a political process driven by value, as it seeks to 
challenge and change the unequal power relationships that result in people marginalized 
socially, political, and economically. Advocacy process include: (1) reject unequal power 
relations in every level, including patriarchy, from a personal to the public, from family to 
government; (2) involve government agencies to empower marginalized parties; (3) 
create and use “space” in the system for a change; (4) stragetgies using knowledge, 
skills, and opportunity in influencing public policy; and (5) integrate the micro-level 
activity and macro-level policy initiatives. 
 








Furthermore, Samuel (2007: 616)12 conducted a study on the process of advocacy in 
India. According to Samuel, in the Indian context, grassroots organization and 
mobilization is used to build awareness and demand rights as citizens, and ensure the 
credibility, legitimacy, and the bargaining power of public advocacy. In India, one of the 
many advocacy of social justice is the application of legislation (social injustice 
legislation) and social security programs. Including progressive legislation such as the 
Equal Remuneration Act, the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Bonded Labour Prohibition Act, 
and the Prevention of Atrocities against Schedule Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act. 
 
The party that advocates departs from an understanding and belief that the injustices 
inflicted on the poor or oppressed communities, due to the birth order of asymmetrical 
social power relations are unequal. Power relations are unequal and undemocratic that 
lould produce the decision-making process and mechanisms that deny the participation 
of the poor (marginalize groups). Decision-making processes and mechanisms that are 
not democratic in itself produces a variety of policies that harm the rights and interests of 
the poor (marginalized-groups). In this perspective, advocacy is an activity planned 
jointly by community groups, for the purpose of transforming the system of social 
relations that gave birth asymmetrical power relations are not democratic towards the 
realization of the social fabric underlying symmetrical power relations more democratic 
and fair. Toward the ideal society that advocacy activities are planned and performed. 
 
In the Indonesian context, advocacy activities undertaken by NGOs and grassroots 
organizations include various forms of advocacy such as: education, awareness, and 
organizing groups of poor people, providing legal assistance activities that promote 
ligitation or defense of the rights and interests of the poor in the front court. Lonnying 
activities to the centers of decision-making with respect to environmental management 
by NGOs enganged in advocacy and environmental law, such as the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation (YLBHI), the Idonesian Environmental Forum (Walhi), and many other 
environmental organizations. Similarly, the consumer society of Indonesia through the 
Indonesian Consumers Foundation and other consumer NGOs have long been 
advocating the rights and interests of consumers through education and awareness 
programs, ligitation, and lobbying to the centers of decision-making in order to birth a 
policy that is responsive and productive the rights of consumers. 
 
Furthermore, Miller and Covey (2005:13)13 states that the approach to advocacy can be 
varied depending on the political context in which the organization works. Advocacy 
strategies can vary from approaches that emphasize co-operation with the authorities to 
approach that focuses on education and appeals, and finally to openly oppose the 
approach and the use of combined strategies are mutually reinforcing. For example, one 
of the NGOs working in Africa under an authoritarian regime approaches behind the 
scenes to create change. In the Philippines, in the case of the Urban Land Restructuring 
where a broad coalition of NGOs, housing associations, and major church leaders using 
approaches that range from demonstrations in the street to a banquet held by the 
Catholic bishops to important commissions in Congress and the drafting of legislation to 
important committees in Congress. In Ecuador a strong national indigenous movement in 
collaboration with supporters of the ruling church as well as important international 
NGOs allied to overturn legislation that would eliminate legal protections on lands owned 
by indigenous. For fear that their land will eventually disappear, the Indian movement 
using a wide range of advocacy strategies and tactics to achieve their goals. First they 
ask the advice of the members on the impact of the law, gather knowledge and the 
findings of their grass roots and then mobilize the members to open up political space for 





negotiation with the government. To expand the space, they blockaded highways, 
occupied government buildings, causing media coverage, using the court system to 
obtain a favorable decision when the army intervened, and spoke with officials from 
major bank in Washington.These actions ultimately led to negotiations with the country's 
president and other government leaders to produce significant concessions that 
eliminate most of the legal aspects of an unbearable it. 
 
Meanwhile, referring to the process of social intervention intervention through changes in 
ongoing social relationships (Bennett, 1987:13)14. Social intervention process, including 
how to start a change, evolve, and survive in the social world. According to Parson 
(Bennett, 1987:13)15, social intervention related to the process of changing the system, 
not the process of change in the system. Change the system is related to changes or 
transformations that try to overcome problem in the system. 
 
According to Loewenberg (1977:7)16, in the context of social work, the term social 
interventions emphasize the active participation, aim, and planned both by the client and 
social worker in every phase of the process of social intervention. Intervention activities 
are a response to a specific problem or condition the occurrence of an effort to prevent 
the development of problems in individuals, groups, or communities. Furthermore 
Loewenberg (1977: 25)17 states that the processes of social intervention include: (1) 
Problem Recognition, (2) Request for Help, (3) Preliminary Assessment, (4) Problem 
Assessment and Goal Identification; (5) Strategy Development, (6) Contract Negotiation; 
(7) Impelemntation of Strategy; (8) Feedback and Evaluation, and (9) Termination. 
 
Critical intervention is one of the techniques used in handling (rehabilitation) social 
disaster victims. Critical interventions, ie interventions that aim to provide as much 
support and assistance to individuals and families, in order to allow people who helped 
regain psychological balance as quickly as possible18. According to Roberts (Payne, 
1997: 101), the steps in the critical interventions include: (1) to assess risk and safety of 
clients and others, (2) establish rapport and communication with clients; (3) major 
identity problems; (4) deal with feelings and provide support; (5) explore possible 





This study uses an interpretive-constructivist paradigm. All research is characterized by 
an interpretive guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how to 
understand and study it (Denzim & Lincoln, 2009:16)19. According Denzim and Guba 
(Salim, 2001:71)20, the purpose of research of the interpretive-constructivist paradigm is 
to hold a reconstruction of understanding and social action. According Marvasti 
(2004:8)21, the purpose of the research constructionism is concerned with how cultural 
and situational variation in coloring (shape) a reality. The research approach used is 











qualitative approach. According Denzim and Lincoln (2009:6)22, the word qualitative 
implies an emphasis on processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined or 
has not been measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. Types or 
methods used in this study is phenomenology. According Denzim and Guba (Salim, 
2001:89)23, phenomenology is the method is a method of research with a qualitative 
approach. Similarly, Creswell (2007: 53)24 which states that phenomenology is one of the 
five approaches to qualitative inquiry. Data collection techniques include interviews, 
observation, and documentation. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Lapindo mudflow disaster impact: 
Lapindo mudflow disaster on May 29, 2006 are already affecting people and the 
environment in the district of Sidoarjo, particularly in areas in three districts well into the 
Affected Area Map and outside the region Affected Areas map, namely: Porong, 
Tanggulangin and District Jabon. Lapindo mudflow disaster has destroyed about 16 
villages, of which 1,071 acres area that includes the area of agriculture, aquaculture, 
industrial, and residential areas must be vacated, either by drowning or due to mudflow 
declared uninhabitable as a result of social, subsidence , and the danger of blowouts. 
While more than about 15,788 households or 48,983 people had to move from their 
home residence to a new place. 
 
Lapindo mudflow disaster impact than in changes in the region Porong, Tanggulangin, 
and Jabon due to the loss of some areas due to drowning or uninhabitable mud, also has 
led to changes in various aspects, such as: economic, social, environmental, education, 
and so on. 
 
Damaged assets consist of: (1) Land and building residential population, (2) productive 
crops, such as rice, sugarcane, and pulses, (3) building and plant equipment, and (4) 
infrastructure, such as highways, power lines, irrigation systems, water supply networks, 
telecommunication networks, gas pipelines, etc.. 
 
Economic losses due to mudflow at least divided into two, namely direct cost or indirect 
losses of Rp 50 billion per day, and the indirect costs or indirect losses of Rp 500 billion 
per day. According to the Governor of East Java, Soekarwo, with reference to the results 
of studies of the Faculty of Economics, University of Brawijaya, Lapindo mud disaster 
losses reach Rp 33 trillion per year. 
 
The data in 2009, as many as 3,562 workers affected by layoffs from several companies 
closed and several other companies to make cuts workers/employees. 2,302 temporary 
workers mudflow victims still in limbo without a job due to the factory mud. According to 
the Indonesia National Human Rights Commission (Komna HAM), the public's right to 
work or create new jobs also disappeared mud. According to recent data (2013) as 
described by the chairman of the Association of Company Lapindo Mudflow Victims 
(GPKLL), Drs. S.H. Ritonga, that there are 33 companies/factories are forced to close 
due to waterlogged mud which caused approximately 10,000 employees (workers) lose 
his job. In the field of education, at least about 33 school buildings ranging from 
kindergarten to high school destroyed mud. As a result, 5,397 students have transferred 







to another school or studying at school emergency. Such conditions are a threat to the 
school dropouts.  
 
The material losses triggered non-physical impacts on the communities that have 
resulted in loss of no less value to the loss of material, namely socio-cultural losses, and 
losses of psychology and public health. Non-physical impact is not yet a major concern 
those responsible, which should also provide compensation to the affected people 
affected by the damage, socio-cultural, psychological and health. For example, socio-
cultural impact of the destruction of the social order, values, norms, and traditions that 
have already built dozens or even hundreds of years in the life of the community; health 
effects, namely the emergence of a variety of illnesses suffered by the victims of the 
Lapindo mudflow disaster, such as : Acute Respiratory inspections (based on reports of 
three health centers in the three districts affected, there is a significant increase in the 
number of patients with respiratory disorders), skin cancer, cough-cough, etc.; 





Advocacy efforts of NGOs for victims of Sidoarjo mud conducted through the litigation 
process, which includes: 
 
First; action lawsuit against the law and violations of Human Rights (Ham) in Sidoarjo 
hot mudflow case by the Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI: Yayasan Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum Indonesia). 
 
In December of 2006, approximately eight months after the Lapindo mudflow, Lapindo 
mudflow victims to take action in the form of tort claims and violations of Ham. Action of 
social movements the Lapindo mudflow victims in order to demand accountability to the 
government and PT. LBI violations of Human Rights. This action is supported and 
represented by a team, the "Humanitarian Advocacy Team Sidoarjo Mud Victims", which 
consists of 59 public advocates and assistant public advocate of the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation (YLBHI). Victims Humanitarian Advocacy Team Lumpur Sidoarjo, take 
action lawsuit against the law in the case of Lapindo mud. Letter of claim submitted to 
the Chairman of the District Court (Pengadilan Negeri) Central Jakarta, on December 8, 
2006, in case No.. 384/Pdt.G/2006/PN.JKT.PST25.  
 
Victims Humanitarian Advocacy Team on behalf of the Sidoarjo mudflow victims of the 
Lapindo mudflow disaster, sued the defendant, namely: the President of the Republic of 
Indonesia (the first defendant), the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (the 
second defendant), the Minister of Environment (as the defendant III), Oil and Gas 
Executive Agency (as the defendant IV), the Governor of East Java (named as 
defendants V), Regent of Sidoarjo (named as defendants VI), and the PT. Lapindo 
Brantas Incorporated (as the co-defendant). According to the plaintiffs, the defendants 
have committed acts against the law in the case of Sidoarjo mud. According to the 
plaintiffs, that even from the beginning has to be taken into account would cause adverse 
impact on the environment and humanity, the defendant did not take the necessary 
measures to anticipate the impact of the mudflow in the early days of the mudflow. This 
shows that the defendants, as state officials have not acted in accordance with its legal 
obligations. 
 




According to the Indonesia Legal Aid of Foundation (YLBHI), that the loss caused by the 
mudflow and protracted treatment include the following losses: (1) the right to life in the 
form of loss of life due to its gas pipeline explosion on November 22, 2006: (2) The right 
to life viable form of declining quality of life of people who suffer the hot mudflow direct 
and indirect victims of the wider community affected by the hot mudflow, (3) the right to 
freedom from fear experienced by victims and potential victims and society in Sidoarjo 
and surrounding areas including fishermen in the Madura strait, (4) the right to housing 
experienced by victims who have lost their homes due to hot mudflow, (5) the right to 
work in the form of loss of livelihood and employment due to hot mudflow, (6) the right to 
education in the form of loss of educational opportunities due to undergo hot mudflow; 
(7) children's rights in the form of dispossession of the rights of children to acquire good 
care of his parents, to play and be creative, and take part in education, due to hot 
mudflow; (8) women's rights a loss of protection to women, especially girls and women 
due to hot mudflow, and (9) in the form of loss of proprietary property belonging to 
victims of the hot mudflow.  
 
The Indonesia National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) concluded several 
human rights violations caused by the Lapindo mudflow in Porong-Sidoarjo, East Java. 
As for some of the violations of human rights such as the rights to life. Based on the 
findings of the national Commission on Human Rights, the government failed to meet the 
standards and the right to a decent environment. Another breach in terms of the right to 
information. It is focused on information related to disenfranchise the drilling project is 
done, then the right to security against the threat of a mud embankment collapse at any 
time submerge homes. In this case, the government also did not make the early warning 
system. Coupled with the emergence of gas bubbles that could potentially cause a fire. 
Not only that, Lapindo mud disaster in Sidoarjo Porong also eliminates the right of self-
development, the right to housing, right to food, right to health, right to work, as well as 
the right to education. Because the mud disaster, carrying 2,288 people stopped working 
due to the factories where they worked was not operating. Then there are 33 schools are 
damaged so that 1,774 students from elementary, junior high, high school, and a 
boarding school lost a place to learn because they are inundated by mud26. 
 
The Indonesia National Commission on Human Rights, also noted, due to the mud 
disaster, the victims lost welfare rights (property rights) of the assets they lost snatched 
away the mud. It also has implications for the loss of a family and the right to continue 
the descent. National Commission on Human Rights of Indonesia also mentioned that in 
the context in Porong Sidoarjo mud disaster, the government or the responsible party 
has also violated the rights of vulnerable groups such as the disability, the elderly, 
children, and women. Proven in the field, there is no special treatment for pregnant 
women and there is no guarantee of security against girls from violence or sexual abuse 
because there are no specific separation between men and women. With the violation of 
the rights of the victims of the mud, then it implies their right to social security is also not 
met at all. 
 
Plaintiff appealed to the District Court Judge for the Central Jakarta deign hear and 
determine the following: (1) Receiving and for entirely in favor of PLAINTIFF, (2) stated 
that the Defendant and Co-defendant has done tort, (3) Punish THE DEFENDANT to 
issue a policy that co-defendant ordered to restore the rights of the victims of the 
mudflow in Sidoarjo with the provision that the affected communities regain their rights to 
equal or better value as the original state before the mud volcano coupled with full 
responsibility for the victims have not been met rights, (4) party defendant Ordered co-
defendant issued a policy in order to be together soon stop the mudflow to mobilize all 




available resources and consider the Peoples rights, including the right to a healthy 
environment; (5) order the parties Defendant issued a policy that can guarantee legally 
that co-defendant would bear the entire costs that have been and will be incurred related 
to the reduction in Sidoarjo hot mudflow and the restoration of the rights of victims, (6) 
Defendant ordered to instruct the ranks of law enforcement agencies explicitly take legal 
action expressly, law enforcement and prosecution of all those responsible, including 
responsible business leaders whose activities have triggered the mud volcano; and (7) 
Orders to the Defendant and Co-defendant to apologize in writing to the victims who 
announced through 5 (five) national television station, 5 (five) radio stations and 10 (ten) 
national print media for three consecutive days the contents of which reads as follows: 
"We, the President, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources of 
Indonesia, the Minister of State for the Environment, Chairman of the 
Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas RI; Governor of East Java; 
Sidoarjo Regent; Lapindo Brantas Incorporated, expressed deep regret over 
the illegal acts we do related to negligence and negligence do our legal 
obligations associated with the occurrence of mud volcano that claimed the 
human rights of the victims and the people of Sidoarjo and surrounding 
areas, as well as create environmental damage impact material and 
immaterial losses were large and widespread. Presumably a statement of 
regret over this tort form the starting point of respect, protection and 
fulfillment of human rights and environmental management system changes 
the quality and the quality of benefits used for the greater rights of Indonesian 
citizens ". 
Panel of Judges of the District Court (PN) Central Jakarta rejected claims the Indonesian 
Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) against the government and PT Lapindo Brantas 
Incorporated (Inc) about the handling of the mudflow. Central Jakarta District Court 
decision dated 27 November 2007 stated that the government rejected the lawsuit Legal 
Aid Foundation and PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc.., Not guilty of an unlawful act. On hearing 
the reading of the verdict in the Central Jakarta District Court judges chaired Moefri just 
consider that PT Lapindo was quite a lot of money to cope with the mud flow. Assembly 
stated that the government and Lapindo not guilty tort unfulfilled due to the economic, 
social, cultural and the victims of the mudflow27. 
 
Assembly rejected all claims defendant as a whole. Assembly considered that the 
government has issued a policy that needs to handle the mudflow that occurred in May 
2006, by setting up an integrated management team mud. Meanwhile, PT Lapindo 
Brantas Inc., Was judged to have a lot of money, of which R1, 6 billion for the refugees 
and to handle the mudflow and to pay the cost of living allowance (rations) for the 
refugees. "Since the mudflow occurred at a drilling location on May 29, 2006, refugees 
have been evacuated to Porong Market with transportation provided by Lapindo. Lapindo 
also have to pay the contract fee and the cost of the displaced school children of the 
victims, "said Martini Mardja. 
 
The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) formally appealed the decision of the 
Central Jakarta District Court, which refused Legal Aid Foundation lawsuit-related cases 
of Lapindo  mudflow. Appeal itself is done by the decision of the judges is weak. 
Grounds of appeal do Legal Aid Foundation, because it still believes the decision of the 
judges have a substantial number of weaknesses. One of them was the judges not to 
consider any violation of rights fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural victims, such 
as the loss of homes, jobs, land, and so on. But the High Court (PT) in Jakarta on June 
13, 2008 it upheld the verdict the District Court (PN) in Central Jakarta on November 27, 




2007 stating that the Sidoarjo mudflow incident because of the tendency of nature is 
more dominant, not because of human error. 
 
Furthermore the Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) filed an appeal to the Supreme 
Court. However the decision of the Supreme Court on 3 April 2009 rejected the appeal 
stating that the Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation of the mudflow is a natural phenomenon 
and not the fault of the industry, and this decision has permanent legal force (inkracht). 
In his statement in the House of the Supreme Court (MA), Central Jakarta, Head of 
Public Relations of the Supreme Court, Nurhadi said that the appeals by the Legal Aid 
Foundation to Lapindo won Lapindo. Nurhadi also explained, that the rejection of an 
appeal by the Legal Aid Foundation repetition of the arguments that have been proposed 
previously, and the results of evidence submitted can not be considered on appeal28. 
 
Second; Action Lawsuit Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi). Along with the 
lawsuit in the District Court of Central Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation, Indonesian Forum 
for Environment (Walhi) also initiate a case in the South Jakarta District Court. 
 
The Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi) filed a lawsuit against PT Lapindo 
Brantas and the government because it is considered responsible for the environmental 
damage caused by the mudflow in Sidoarjo. Civil suit was filed to the South Jakarta 
District Court. While the lawsuit against the government, because the government has 
disregarded and deemed not to control. Walhi sued 12 parties, namely: Lapindo, PT 
Energi Mega Persada, Kalila Energy Limited, Pan Asia Enterprise, PT Medco Energy, 
Santos Australia Limited. From the government, which sued the President, the Minister 
of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas, 
Ministry of Environment, the Governor of East Java and Sidoarjo Regent29. 
 
But apparently Walhi lawsuit against PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc., and the government was 
rejected by the South Jakarta District Court in Jakarta. South Jakarta District Court, on 
the 27th of December 2007, dismissed the suit filed legal standing the Indonesian 
Environmental Forum (Walhi) on Lapindo mudflow case. In the verdict, the judges won 
12 defendants, including PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., and the government. Judge 
considers, mudflow at the Banjar Panji-1, Sidoarjo, East Java, is a common natural 
phenomenon. This decision is considered Walhi as environmental injustice. The reason 
the panel of judges in a ruling that was read out yesterday because the defendant PT 
Lapindo Brantas Inc., acquitted of committing a tort in the mudflow case that resulted in 
damage to the environment as Walhi sued. Although rejected Walhi lawsuit, but the 
judge insisted that the defendants claimed to fulfill the moral responsibility that is 
designed to stop the mudflow. 
 
Walhi subsequent appeal in the level of High Court of Jakarta. But the ruling High Court 
of  Jakarta on October 27, 2008 the South Jakarta District Court upheld the verdict 
Desembar December 27, 2007 stating that the mudflow in Sidoarjo caused by natural 
phenomena. South Jakarta District Court Clerk a letter dated January 14, 2009 which 
states each party not filed its objection, so the decision legally High Court of  Jakarta on 
October 27, 2008 and binding (inkracht). 
 
Advocacy efforts undertaken by the NGO of the Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) 
and the Indonesian Environmental Forum WALHI in defending the interests of victims of 
the Lapindo mudflow disaster through litigation turned out a failure. 
 







Government intervention in the rehabilitation process of social facilitation manifested in 
three forms, namely: policy, institutional, and allocation of budget funds. 
 
First; Facilitation Policy. The impact of government policy on the handling of the Sidoarjo 
mudflow mudflow since the events of 2006 to 2013, stated in Presidential Decree, as 
follows: 
1. dated 8 September 2006 presidential decree (Presidential) No. 13 of 2006 on 
the National Team in the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation (PSLs national team). 
This team has a duty to take operational steps in an integrated manner in 
order to control the mudflow in Sidoarjo which include: closure of the mud 
flow, mudflow handling, and handling of sludge problems. Establishment of 
National Team in Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation does not reduce the 
responsibility of PT. Lapindo Brantas to perform mitigation and restoration of 
environmental damage and social problems it causes. Costs required for the 
implementation of the National Team duties charged to the budget of PT. 
Lapindo Brantas. 
 
2. dated 8 April 2007 issue Presidential Decree (Decree) Nomo 14 of 2007 on 
the Sidoarjo Mud Mitigation Agency. Presidential Regulation No. 14 of 2007 
replaces the Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2006, thus the existence of the 
National Response Team Mudflow in Sidoarjo (PSLS) has ended and their 
duties taken over by the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS). BPLS 
task is dealing with the mudflow mitigation efforts, handles mudflow, 
addressing social issues and infratsruktur caused mudflow in Sidoarjo, with 
attention to the smallest environmental risks. 
 
In appendix Presidential Decree Number 14 of 2007 included the area that 
goes into the Affected Area Map, which is the area submerged in mud, as the 
proposed national team PSLs. The Affected Area Map entrance area includes 
four villages namely: Siring Village, Village Jatirejo, Kedung Bendo, and 
Renokenongo village, then in the Affected Area Map region plus six villages, 
namely: the village of Ketapang, Kalitengah Village, Village Glagah Arum, 
Gempolsari Village, Pejarakan, Mindi village, and the village Keboguyang. 
The total area in the Affected Area Map, ie the area of mud, their full covering 
613.4 Ha. Under article 15, Presidential Decree No. 14 of 2007, PT. Lapindo 
Brantas Inc., required to buy the land and buildings owned by citizens who 
are in the Affected Area Map  region through trading scheme with phased 
payments, ie 20% prepaid and the rest paid no later than one month before 
the contract period of 2 (two) years out. But until now the process of buying 
and selling land and building assets by PT Lapindo Brantas Inc.,  could not be 
solved completely. Based on the result of an agreement between the victims 
of the PT Lapindo Brantas Inc.,  it was agreed the value of the sale, namely: 
for the building of Rp 1.5 million per square meter, land for land for Rp 1 
million per square meter, and to the land of rice fields Rp 150 thousand per 
square meter. 
 
3. dated July 17, 2008, issued Presidential Decree No. 48 Year 2008 on 
Amendment of Presidential Regulation No. 14 Year 2007 on the Sidoarjo Mud 
Mitigation Agency. One consideration of the issuance of Presidential Decree 
No. 48 of 2008 is that the mudflow in Sidoarjo have social impact for the 
community outside the Affected Area Map  dated March 22, 2007 
(Attachment Presidential Decree No. 14 of 2007). Furthermore, the process of 
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buying and selling of land and buildings owned by citizens who enter the area 
outside the Affected Area Map  performed by the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation 
Agency (BPLS) with reference to the amount of the sale price paid by PT. 
Lapindo Brantas Inc., to ground and the building of community members who 
are in Affected Area Map. Costs of buying and selling outside the PAT as 
Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2008 was charged to state funds. As such, 
since the Presidential Decree No. rises. 48/2007 the areas affected by the 
Lapindo mud grouped into two categories, namely: in the Affected Area Map  
region and outside  Affected Area Map region. 
 
4. Further, dated 23 September 2009 published Presidential Decree Number 40 
Year 2009; later dated 27 September 2011 published Presidential Decree 
Number 68 Year 2011; dated 5 April 2012 rose Presidential Decree No. 37 of 
2012, and last, on May 8, 2013 issue Presidential Decree Number 33 of. The 
core of this regulation is different to the addition of an area outside the 
Affected Area Map (PAT). Specialized in Perpes No. 33 of 2013 has started 
to set about the mechanism panggantian / exchange waqf land. 
 
Second, Institutional Formation. In particular, to address various issues related to the 
Sidoarjo mudflow disaster, the government set up an agency, namely: the Sidoarjo 
Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS: Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo) which is 
regulated by Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 14 Year 2007 
concerning the Sidoarjo Mud Mitigation Agency. This regulation established by the 
Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS) in charge of the response to the mud flow, 
mudflow handling, dealing with social issues and infrastructure caused by the mudflow in 
Sidoarjo, with attention to the smallest environmental risks. Furthermore the Sidoarjo 
Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS) reported performance of its duties to the President. 
 
BPLS consists of the Governing Board and the Executive Board. The Steering 
Committee is responsible for providing direction, guidance and supervision of the 
implementation of the mudflow prevention efforts, mudflow handling, handling social 
issues and infrastructure caused by the mudflow in Sidoarjo, which implemented 
Executive Agency. The Steering Committee consists of: Chairman: Minister of Public 
Works, and member; Vice Chairman: Minister of Social Affairs; concurrent Member; 
Members: Minister of Finance, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Minister of Transportation, Minister of 
State for Planning National Development Planning / Head of National Development 
Planning Agency, Ministry of Environment, the National Land Agency, the Governor of 
East Java, the regional military commander V / Brawijaya, East Java Regional Police 
Chief, and Regent of Sidoarjo. The organizational structure of the Executive Board 
consists of: Head of the Executing Agency, Deputy Head of the Executing Agency, the 
Secretary of the Executive Board, Deputy for Operations, Deputy Social Affairs, and 
Deputy of Infrastructure. 
 
Efforts made by BPLS include handling the Lapindo mudflow and handling socio-civic 
problem solving as the impact of the Lapindo mudflow. In efforts to address problem 
solving social, BPLS program include: social assistance, social protection, and social 
recovery. Social assistance is given in the form of: medical aid and clean water and aid 
money contracts, cash evacuation and life assurance money. Social protection is given 
in the form of the process of buying and selling land and buildings owned by Lapindo 
mudflow disaster victims both by PT MLJ or by BPLS. While the process is given in the 
form of social recovery: training activities (sewing shoes, ribbon embroidery, gold 
carpentry, automotive, modes, processed food, sewing machine technician, 
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entrepreneurship, disaster response, and poultry), and extension activities and 
dissemination of information. 
 
Third, Budget Allocation. Determination of Sidoarjo mudflow affected areas are divided 
into two categories, namely: First, areas that belong to the Affected Area Map, and 
Second, outside the regions including Affected Area Map. The impact of the mudflow 
handling funds in the Area Affected Map region is the responsibility of PT. Lapindo 
Brantas Inc.., While the mudflow handling funds that are outside the region Affected Area 
Map is the responsibility of the government through the state budget. 
The total government budget to absorb state budget funds, to control the Lapindo 
mudflow has as much 6.2 trillion rupiah. Budget was calculated from 2008 to 2013. While 
budget allocations in 2007 amounted to 505 billion rupiah taken from the emergency 
budget item. The details are as follows: 2008 budget of 1.1 trillion rupiah, 2009 
amounted to 1,147 trillion rupiah, 2010 amounted to 1.216 trillion rupiah, 2011 amounted 
to 1.286 trillion rupiah, 2012 amounted to 1.533 trillion Rupiahdan 2013 amounted to 
2,256 trillion rupiah30. 
 
In accordance with the mandate of Law No.. 24 Year 2007 on Disaster Management, the 
Indonesia Central Government was in charge of the implementation of disaster 
management, both in the event of natural disasters, non-natural disasters, and social 
disaster. Responsibility of the Indonesia Central Government in Disaster Management 
include: (1) integration of disaster risk reduction and disaster risk reduction into 
development programs, (2) Protection of the public from the effects of disasters, (3) 
Guarantee the fulfillment of rights and refugee communities affected fairly and in 
accordance with the minimum service standards, (4) recovery from disaster conditions, 
(5) Allocation of budget disaster management in the state budget revenues and 
expenditures are adequate; (6) Allocation of budget disaster management in the form of 
ready-made funds (funds that backed the government is ready to use funds in case of a 
disaster), and (7) Maintenance of records / documents authentic and credible than the 
threat and impact of disasters. 
 
While the authority of the Indonesia Central Government in Disaster Management 
include: (1) Establishment of disaster management policy in line with national 
development policies, (2) Preparation of development plans that incorporate elements of 
disaster management policies, (3) Determination of the status of disaster and national 
and regional levels; (4) Determination of policy cooperation in disaster management with 
other countries, agencies, or other international parties, (5) Formulation of policies on the 
use of technology as a potential source of threat or hazard; (6) Formulation of policies to 
prevent and control dewatering natural resources exceeds the natural ability to do the 
recovery, and (7) Control of collecting money or goods that are national (including the 
granting of collecting money or goods that are under the authority of the national Minister 
of Social Affairs). 
From the above explanation, the government intervention in handling the Sidoarjo 
mudflow disaster problems can be summarized as follows: 
 







Government Intervervensi Descripiton 
In Sidoarjo Mudflow  Disaster 














No.. 37/2012, and 
Perpes No. 33/2013. 
In principle this government policy 
regulates matters relating to: the division 
of the territory outside PAT & PAT, 
payment mechanisms sale of land and 
building assets, BPLS basic formation, 
and guarantee the allocation of the state 
budget. 
 
Notes: (1) This policy suggests residents 
as the seller is not a victim, and (2) 
Nothing in the regulation governing the 
recovery of social-ecological life 




PSLs National Teams 
formed then replaced 
with BPLS.   
Task: dealing with the mudflow mitigation 
efforts, handles mudflow, dealing with 
social issues and infrastructure. 
 
Note: Focus BPLS in tackling socio-civic 







allocate funds through 
the State Budget: 
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011 & 2013. 
Until the year 2013 the total budget 
allocation of Rp 6.2 trillion. These funds 
are mostly used for: payment of the sale 
of land and buildings owned by the 
victim's out PAT, closing burst and jetting 
mud, and handling social issues. Note: 
Portions of the budget for social-




CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
From the description of the results of the study as described above, it can be concluded 
as follows: 
Social advocacy to victims of the Lapindo mudflow disaster take place by NGOs in the 
form of litigation and advocacy. NGOs active in social advocacy to victims of the Lapindo 
mudflow disaster such as Indonesian Environmental Forum (Walhi) East Java, and the 
Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI). 
While government intervention in the form: policy, institutional formation, and the 
allocation of funds. Government policies in an effort to overcome the problems stated 
Lapindo mudflow disaster in the form of Presidential Decree, such as: (1) of Presidential 
339 
 
Decree No.13/2006, (2) Presidential Decree No.. 14/2007, (3) Presidential Decree No. 
48 of 2008, (4) Presidential Decree No. 40 of 2009, (5) Presidential Decree Number 68 
Year 2011; (6) Presidential Decree No. 37 of 2012, and (7) Perpes No. 33 of 2013. From 
the institutional aspect, manifested in the form of government intervention team 
formation Sidoarjo Mudflow Management Agency (PSLs), which is then replaced with the 
Sidoarjo Mud Mitigation Agency (BPLS). In terms of budget, the government intervention 
is realized in the form of a Budget allocation policies in the state budget until 2013 is 
already absorb about 6.2 trillion rupiah. 
While the advice that can be given is associated with subsequent research program, 
which is essential for the observed and studied in detail matters relating to the 
implementation of disaster management in handling the Lapindo mud disaster issues, 
which include: migitasi phase, the phase of emergency response, and recovery phases. 
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